Executive Compensation in the Information Technology Industry
Introduction
In selecting a form of business organization and structuring internal contracts, firms must reconcile the risk-sharing advantages of diffuse outside ownership with the motivational advantages of concentrated inside ownership (Jensen and Meckling 1976 ).
This problem is particularly acute in the information technology (IT) industry because IT firms make large, risky investments in inventive activity where the outcomes are unpredictable, idiosyncratic and long-term in nature. In addition, the demand for executives is intense in the rapidly growing IT industry, leading to high turnover of talented individuals. One of the important organizational innovations that has emerged from the IT industry is the use of stock options to attract and retain executives and key employees, and align their long-term incentives with the interests of the firm. Gillmor (1997) remarks: "Silicon Valley and the technology industry in general take pride in a somewhat different system of compensation, and for the most part they should.
Executive salaries in such companies tend to be generous but rational. Tech companies' primary incentives are stock options."
The use of stock options by IT firms is often attributed to their unique culture.
For example, Fefer (1997) describes the "techno-culture of the San Francisco Bay area" as a "powerful mix of innovation, entrepreneurial ambition, and stock options". Fox communities (such as the overseas Chinese) where there is "something in the air" that encourages risk-taking. This suggests that culture, irritatingly vague though it may sound, is more important to Silicon Valley's success than economic or technological factors." In this study, we question whether the way executives are compensated is uniquely attributable to the culture in the IT industry. First, we verify that IT companies (including telecommunications, hardware and electronics, and software and computer services) use more stock options in compensating executives than other companies, and then we evaluate whether the greater use of options by IT firms can be explained by economic relationships that apply to all firms.
Based on previous research, we identify economic factors (and empirical proxies) that are expected to influence the amount and form of compensation, and their relation to performance. We show that there are significant differences in many of the economic factors between the IT firms and other firms. We include the empirical proxies as explanatory variables in a model of compensation practices and estimate the model for all firms. While the model explains much of the variation in the data, there is a significant residual effect picked up by an IT dummy, suggesting that the economic relationships specified in the model do not completely explain the greater use of option compensation by IT firms.
Critics of option compensation contend that options are overused because there is no accounting requirement to recognize the ex-ante value of options granted or the expost value of options exercised (Bryant 1997) . Stewart (1990) asks why the use of stock options is growing and observes: "A principal -and astonishing -reason is that stock options are the only major form of compensation that never shows up as a cost on a company's profit-and-loss statement." Reingold (1997) contends: "(T)he mega-grants (of stock options) don't necessarily lead to mega-results … (F)or every master of the universe, there are many masters of the mundane making pots of profits as their company's stock lags the market." Discussing senior executive compensation at Apple Computer, Intuit, Silicon Graphics, Shiva, and Acclaim Entertainment, Jeffers (1997) concludes: "(O)verpaying ineffectual CEOs is regrettably becoming commonplace in technology." The relevant concern is whether the value of total compensation including the ex-ante value of options granted is justifiable based on a firm's condition and circumstances. We find that, when economic factors are considered, IT executives are not paid more than non-IT executives.
We specify a system of simultaneous equations that captures the interplay between the amount of compensation, firm performance, and the form of compensation.
Our research extends previous research on incentive contracting in several ways. Most previous research has considered the effect of performance on pay without considering the simultaneous effect of pay on performance. Boschen and Smith (1995) specify an empirical model that considers this simultaneous relationship. We extend their model by including endogenous variables that measure the form of compensation (salary, bonus, or stock options).
Previous compensation research has either relied on data obtained from Forbes surveys (e.g., Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker 1992; Larcker 1987, Jensen and or data collected directly from proxy statements (e.g., Smith 1985, 1986; Murphy 1985) . The Forbes surveys include cash compensation data on CEOs and the realized gains on options exercised. Since the realized gains on options do not measure the value of options granted, most researchers have used cash compensation only. Direct collection of compensation data from proxy statements issued before 1992 was difficult because there were many reporting inconsistencies across firms and across years. Changes in SEC disclosure rules, which took effect in 1992, improved disclosure of compensation information considerably. We use the recently developed ExecuComp data set, which includes detailed compensation information (including noncash compensation) for top executives at 1,724 firms over a 5 year period. Use of this data set allows us to work with a broader set of executives and a more complete measure of compensation than is used in most previous studies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and the compensation of IT and non-IT executives during the sample period. Section 3 identifies economic factors expected to influence performance and the amount and form of compensation. Section 4 describes the empirical model and section 5 the results of its estimation. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Descriptive information
We analyze the ExecuComp data set to identify trends in executive compensation practices and assess the use of stock options in IT and other firms. This data set includes annual information on the compensation of the top five executives at 1,724 firms included in the S&P 500, mid-cap, and small-cap indices for the years 1992 to 1996. Of the 115 different industry groups in the database, 16 represent the IT industry. The IT industry includes 243 firms as detailed in table 1. The ExecuComp data presents two measures of option compensation, an ex-ante measure of the grant date value of options issued during a period and an ex-post measure of the amount realized by executives from the exercise of options during a period. We use the ex-ante value because this measures the value of the option component of total compensation in the grant year. The ex-ante value is measured using the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing formula. A typical employee stock option is granted for a term of ten years with an exercise price equal to the market price of the underlying stock at the issue date, and a vesting period of one to five years (Buenaventura and Peck 1993) .
Assuming an exercise price equal to a current market price of $50, a stock return volatility of 0.30, an expected dividend rate of 3% and a risk-free interest rate of 8%, the 
Endogenous variables
Agency theory provides two reasons for linking compensation and performance.
A moral hazard problem (Holmström 1979, Feltham and Xie 1994) occurs when the agent's effort level and its allocation to different tasks are not perfectly observable by the principal. The executive's incentives are aligned with the firm's by tying compensation to observable signals of current and future performance. An adverse selection problem (Kreps 1990 ) occurs when the agent is better informed about his ability than the principal. To attract more talented managers, the firm offers a contract that is sensitive to current and future performance and lets managers self-select (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) . Also, the firm adjusts the manager's total pay periodically as information about ability is revealed through past performance (Fama 1980, Gibbons and Murphy 1992) .
Several empirical studies support the sensitivity of executive pay to performance (e.g., Murphy 1985 Murphy , 1986 Jensen and Murphy 1990; Ely 1991; Boschen and Smith 1995) .
Performance is positively impacted by total compensation because pay reflects the firm's assessment of the executive's ability (Boschen and Smith 1995) . A pay-forperformance compensation contract also leads to improved firm performance (Kahn and Scherer 1990; Abowd 1990; Banker, Lee and Potter 1996) by attracting and retaining more talented executives, and motivating greater congruence between their actions and the firm's interests. Algebraically, the proportion of total pay attributable to pay-forperformance incentive pay increases as performance improves. Increased reliance on pay-for-performance incentives imposes greater risk on the executive, and because of the higher risk premium, the expected value of the total pay is also increased. Thus, agency theory posits a simultaneous relationship between amount and form of pay, and performance. We focus on bonuses and options as the two principal performance-sensitive components of total compensation. Since bonus pay and option pay are alternative forms of performance-sensitive compensation, as substitutes they should be negatively related to each other. 
Economic factors
We identify economic factors (and empirical proxies) that influence the need for performance-sensitive compensation, and those that favor the use of stock options over bonus. Since employee stock options are inalienable, usually have vesting provisions of three to five years, and are more valuable unexercised than exercised until the ratio of the stock price to the exercise price gets sufficiently high (Huddart 1994) , they tie a manager's wealth to the long-term performance of the firm (Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia 1991) . Therefore, stock options may be favored over cash compensation as a means of enhancing long-term performance and retaining managers.
Moral hazard
Moral hazard problems are greater in firms where the manager's effort can have a larger impact on firm performance, and where the manager's actions are more difficult to observe. These conditions are present in firms with more growth prospects (Smith and Watts 1992) . We use sales growth (growth) and the market-to-book (mrktbk) ratio as proxies for growth prospects and dividend payout (divpay) as an indicator of the absence of growth prospects (Gaver and Gaver 1996) . We expect performance sensitivity (BONSHR and OPTSHR) to increase with sales growth and the market-to-book ratio, and to decrease with dividend payout. Since regulated industries have fewer growth prospects, we expect that performance-sensitivity will be lower in regulated industries (regdum).
Since bonuses and options are both forms of performance-sensitive compensation, we expect similar effects for the moral hazard variables in the bonus share and options share equations. The use of stock options for compensation, however, provides a lingering incentive effect that the use of cash bonuses does not provide. Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987), Clinch (1991) , and Gaver and Gaver (1993) also find greater use of stock options in growth firms that need to extend the managers' time horizon for decision making.
Adverse selection
The problem of attracting and retaining talented executives is more acute when the demand is stronger, and executive turnover is greater. We measure executive turnover as the number of employees included in the top five positions during our five years of data (trnovr). We expect performance-sensitivity to increase with turnover.
As a manager's tenure increases, information about the manager's ability may be gleaned from past performance with the firm. Therefore, the adverse selection problem and, consequently, performance-sensitivity may decline with the tenure of the employee.
We use the years credited to retirement (yrsret) as an indicator of the employee's tenure.
Stock return volatility
When the performance signal is less precise, performance-sensitivity of compensation is lower because the agent bears more risk caused by variance in the performance signal (Banker and Datar 1989) . For this reason, it should be negatively related to bonus share and options share. Stock return volatility is a measure of the risk associated with owning the stock or options on the stock. 4 It should be positively related to total compensation because of the cost of risk-sharing, and to performance (stock returns) because of the risk-return tradeoff.
Holdings A manager's ownership interest in the firm aligns incentives and reduces the need for performance-sensitive compensation (Benston 1985 , Lewellen 1971 , Murphy 1985 .
Therefore, we expect that stock returns will be positively influenced by holdings, and the bonus share and options share will be negatively related to holdings. We include variables for stock holdings and unexercised option holdings as follows. We multiply the number of shares held by the manager by the closing stock price and divide by the manager's total compensation to obtain a relative measure of the manager's current stockholdings (shrhol). To make the measure of option holdings comparable to the measure of stockholdings, we use the number of unexercised options multiplied by the closing stock price and deflated by the manager's total compensation (opthol). This, of course, overstates the value of the option holdings, but gives a reasonable measure of the sensitivity of the manger's wealth to changes in the stock price.
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Total compensation may also be influenced by holdings of the manager.
Managers with large share holdings may overpay or underpay themselves since they are not subject to the same market conditions as other managers. Option holdings may reduce total compensation if they reduce managers' mobility in the managerial labor market (Scouras 1997) .
Income tax considerations
Beginning in 1994, section 162(m) of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 took effect. This section limits deductibility by the firm of executive compensation for any executive to $1 million unless the compensation is clearly linked to specific performance criteria such as earnings per share or stock returns. Stock options generally qualify as performance-based compensation if the exercise price is greater than or equal to the stock price at the grant date. Bonuses qualify if an ex-ante bonus formula tied to specific performance measures is used. Restricted stock does not qualify unless the restriction is performance-based. Therefore, both bonus and options compensation will be more prevalent for executives who receive total compensation greater than $1 million beginning in 1994. We use a dummy variable for compensation greater than $1 million (mildum) in the years 1994 through 1996.
For non-qualifying stock options, the difference between the stock price at the date of exercise and the exercise price (the exercise premium) is taxed as ordinary income to the individual and is deductible as compensation expense by the firm in the year of exercise. 6 Employees receive a tax deferral benefit when they substitute options for cash compensation. Since cash compensation is taxable upon receipt, an employee's investment base is immediately reduced. Since option compensation is taxable in the year of exercise, employees have a larger investment base (before exercise) than they 5 The data does not distinguish between in-the-money and out-of-the-money options. A manager's wealth would be less sensitive to stock price movements for out-of-the-money options. 6 The exercise premium on incentive stock options is taxed as a capital gain to the individual but is not deductible by the firm. These options were not widely used during 1993-1996. would have if they were paid in cash. The value of the tax deferral benefit increases with the effective tax rate. For this reason, we predict that the option share of total compensation will be higher in states where the individual income tax rate (taxrat) is higher.
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Managers who can move across states will demand higher compensation in states with higher tax rates. Therefore, total compensation should increase with state income tax rates (taxrat).
Cash concerns
Paying with options instead of cash preserves current cash for other uses. Firms may substitute stock options for cash compensation when cash is in short supply (Scouras 1997) . We use the ratio of net cash flows from operating activities to net cash used for investing activities (cashoi) as a measure of cash availability. We expect that the use of option compensation relative to bonus compensation will be greater for firms that have low ratios of cash flow from operating activities to cash flow used for investing activities.
Accounting manipulation
Accounting rules do not require firms to deduct the value of options granted from reported income. In recent years, high-tech companies lobbied vigorously against a change in accounting rules that would require expense recognition for stock options.
Lowenstein ( He found weak evidence to support the hypothesis that options are used as a mechanism for increasing earnings. Companies have an incentive, for accounting reasons, to substitute stock options for cash compensation as a means of increasing income when they are in danger of violating debt covenants Zimmerman 1986, Press and Weintrop 1990) . Companies with a high ratio of debt to total assets (dbtrat) and a lower times interest earned (timint) are more likely to be close to violating debt covenants.
Comparison of IT and non-IT firms
Our research objective is to explain observed differences in executive compensation, particularly the higher use of stock options between the IT industry and other firms in terms of firms' economic circumstances. Murphy (1985) finds differences in the performance-compensation relationship across firms and across positions of employees. Baber, Janakiraman and Kang (1996) consider changes in total compensation (including the grant date value of options) and find that the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance varies directly with investment opportunities.
Research intended to explain cross-sectional differences in option awards to CEOs has had mixed results (Yermack 1995) . The most consistent finding is a positive relationship between option awards and growth prospects (Smith and Watts 1992 , Gaver and Gaver 1993 , Kole 1993 , Matsuanaga 1995 , Mehran 1995 . However, previous research has not circumstance, the cash share of compensation will be greater in high tax states.
considered the compensation mix decision simultaneously with total compensation and performance.
We estimate our model using all firms in the sample to assess general relationships between economic factors and compensation components. This provides us with a basis for evaluating whether the general relationships explain the greater use of stock options in the IT industry. An underlying hypothesis is that there are differences between IT firms and other firms in economic factors that affect compensation practices.
Above, we identified variables that measure these factors. In this part, we provide a comparison of these variables. (Kalish 1997) . Stock options are well-suited for reducing turnover because of vesting provisions (Jovanovic 1979) , and because they increase in value with tenure (Salop and Salop 1976) . Unexercised options make it costly for executives to leave. The observed turnover during the five years from 1992-1996 is significantly higher for IT firms. A related measure is the tenure of employees. Tenure provides information about turnover and about the length of time that companies have had to learn about the ability of executives (Murphy 1986 ). Therefore, performance-sensitivity should be higher when tenure is lower. The number of years credited towards retirement is much lower for IT firms than non-IT firms.
8 Previous literature does not provide a quantitative measure of managers' risk aversion. Huddart and Lang (1996) find that top managers option exercise decisions do not appear to be driven largely by risk aversion. 
Predetermined variables
Boschen and Smith include three lags of the total compensation (TTLPAY) and performance (STKRET) variables. Their data included a long time series for a small number of firms. They experimented with multiple lags and found significant lagged effects that dampened over time and were very small after three lags. We limit our specification to one lag because we have only five years of data.
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The lagged value of performance (STKRET t-1 ) is included in the total compensation equation to capture the influence of past performance on current compensation in a multi-period agency model (Rogerson 1985) . There may also be a timing difference between the measurement of performance and the determination of compensation. For example, stock options granted early in 1996 may be a reward for 1995 performance.
The lagged value of total compensation (TTLPAY t-1 ) is included in the total compensation equation to capture the effect of past compensation on current compensation. Many studies (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker 1992) use the first difference of total compensation or cash compensation as the measure of performance-sensitive compensation. Firstdifferenced compensation models implicitly assume that past performance has a permanent effect on pay as firms learn about the executive's ability and revise their prior assessment. If this were true, the estimated coefficient of the lagged compensation variable in our model should equal one, contrary to the finding by Boschen and Smith.
The lagged value of total compensation is included in the performance equation to pick up the relationship between the change in compensation and performance. Boschen and Smith find that this variable is negative and has a magnitude equal to the positive magnitude of the current value of total compensation. This supports the notion that the change in total compensation positively affects performance.
Since there are likely to be timing differences in the measurement of performance for compensation purposes, the lagged stock returns are included in the bonus share and options share equations.
Relative performance
Agency theory suggests that an agent's performance should be evaluated relative to a peer group's performance (Diamond and Verrechia 1982, Holmström 1982) . Antle and Smith (1986) Size and complexity Rosen (1982) argues that the observed systematic relationship between executive compensation and firm size can be attributed to larger, more complex firms hiring better managers. Barro and Barro (1990) show that compensation is strongly associated with size. We use the natural log of sales (lsales) as a measure of firm size and associate sales growth (growth), market-to-book (mrktbk), dividend payout (divpay), and regulated industry (regdum) with complexity (Smith and Watts 1992) . We expect total compensation to increase with sales, sales growth, and market-to-book, and to decrease with dividend payout and regulation. 
Empirical Results
The compensation, performance, bonus and stock options equations are four structural equations that describe the interrelationships among the endogenous variables, and the economic effects of the pre-determined and exogenous variables. Identification of the model and of every equation in the model is checked using the rank and order conditions (Judge et al. 1988) . All four equations are exactly identified with the number of endogenous variables included in every equation equal to the number of exogenous variables excluded (Green, 1990) . We use the two stage least squares method, allowing for correlations of error terms across the four equations to obtain consistent estimators of our model coefficients (Johnston, 1984) .
To address potential dependence between employees from the same firm, we average the 5 observations provided for each firm during a year. 11 After eliminating observations for 1992 because of lagged variables and 2,557 observations with missing values, we estimate the model with 4,339 observations of which 563 are for IT firms.
Model specification checks
Because of the large number of exogenous variables, multicollinearity is a potential problem. However, Belsley, Kuh and Welsch's (1980) diagnostic based on the square root of the ratio of the largest to the smallest characteristic root of the moment matrix indicates that the data do not exhibit high multicollinearity.
Because the data represent both cross-sectional and time-series information, serial correlation may bias the standard errors of the coefficients. We address this by using the Prais-Winsten (1954) estimator to make first order autocorrelation adjustments to the variables in the model. 12 The estimates of the coefficients, their signs and their significance levels do not change appreciably after making these adjustments.
We estimate three versions of the model. First, we estimate the model as presented in table 5. Second, we include intercept dummies for the IT industry and 11 Results remain robust when we estimate the model with individual observations for each executive.
Silicon Valley in each of the four equations. The purpose of this variation is to evaluate whether the economic variables were effective in capturing the differences in the compensation practices between the IT and non-IT firms. Our motivation for including a separate dummy for the 155 Silicon Valley firms is based on articles in the popular press that describe a unique Silicon Valley culture powered by stock options. "The cry in the Valley is that options are part of the culture (Lowenstein 1997) ." Third, we include an additional dummy for the 134 IT firms in Silicon Valley and replace the IT dummy with three separate dummies for 272 hardware, 140 software and services, and 151 telecommunications firms. Our purpose here is to evaluate whether IT effects, if any, are attributable to a specific segment. 12 The absolute values of serial correlation are less than 0.1 for the total compensation and performance equations, 0.51 for the bonus share equation, and 0.39 for the options share equation. Another interesting finding is that option holdings (opthol) have a stronger influence on performance than current option awards. 14 A possible interpretation of these findings is that option awards (as opposed to bonus payments) are based less on current performance and are granted for their long-term incentive qualities.
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The coefficients on total pay (TTLPAY) and lagged total pay (TTLPAY t The exogenous variables regdum, mildum, shrhol, growth, voltil, yrsret, taxrat, and dbtrat are significant determinants of both bonus share and options share with signs as expected, except for volatility which has no significant effect on options share, income tax rate which has a negative effect on both bonus share and options share, and debt ratio which has a negative effect on options share. While we expected the reliance on stock options to increase with turnover, its coefficient is not significant in the options share equation. The coefficient on the million dollar dummy for total compensation is significantly higher in the options share equation than in the bonus share equation, consistent with the observation that options almost always qualify as performance-based compensation under the section 162(m) rules. The significance of the Silicon Valley and IT dummies in the second and third models of the options share equation implies that the economic variables included in the model do not fully explain the greater use of options by IT and Silicon Valley firms.
Sensitivity of estimates
A possible explanation for the significance of the IT and Silicon Valley dummies is that these firms attract people with different risk preferences. While we cannot measure risk preferences directly, a variable that may be related to risk preferences is the age of the managers. We collected information about the age of a number of executives 16 . We found a significant negative relationship between age and performancesensitivity of compensation. Including age as an exogenous variable did not substantially change the signs, magnitudes, or significance levels of the coefficients of the other variables in the model.
Other studies have used the ratio of R & D expenditure to sales as another economic variable representing investment opportunity (Bizjak et al., 1993; Gaver and Gaver, 1996) . 17 When this variable is included, it is significant like other investment opportunity variables, other results remain robust.
Conclusion
Our empirical results indicate that much of the greater use of options based compensation by IT and Silicon Valley firms can be explained by differences in economic factors that influence the use of options in other firms. The strong impact of unexpired stock option holdings in improving performance and lowering the total compensation required to attract executives is another economic explanator of the use of stock options. However, these economic factors do not fully explain the variation in the use of stock options. It is possible that there are systematic differences in the behavior of IT or Silicon Valley firms and executives, which causes a higher percentage of compensation to be paid as stock options. It is also possible that there is some degree of self-selection, which causes the "risk-takers" to move to these firms.
Concern has been expressed that technology firms overpay senior executives using option compensation because accounting rules do not require a deduction for the fair value of options granted from reported income. Our analysis does not support the notion that Silicon Valley and IT firms overpay senior executives. When performance, tax rate, risk, and other factors expected to influence total compensation are included, we do not find the total compensation in IT firms to be higher than that for other firms.
Articles in the business press suggest that the "options culture" extends to all levels of employees in the Silicon Valley and IT firms. While we find some support for the idea that there is a unique options culture in Silicon Valley or the IT industry at the senior executive level, our data set limits us to this level. However, with the enhanced disclosures now required by FASB 123, future research to extend this analysis to employees at other levels of the organization is indicated.
Finally, while our focus was on understanding executive compensation practices in the IT industry, our analysis extends the cross-disciplinary literature on incentive compensation as well. We explicitly model and empirically document the significant interdependencies between total compensation, performance levels and the form of compensation used. We show that while the share of bonus and options in total compensation is algebraically related to performance, performance itself is simultaneously influenced by change in total compensation, and the extent of reliance on performance based compensation. 17 Including this variable caused an additional 20% loss of observations because of missing values.
